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California Supreme Court Survey
November 1987-January 1988
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme cour4 as well as to serve as a
starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are ana-
lyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline cases
have been omitted from the survey.
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. The Fair Employment and Housing Commission lacks
authority to impose punitive damages in resolving
employment discrimination complaints: Dyna-Med, Inc. v.
Fair Employment & Housing Commission.
In Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, 43
Cal. 3d 1379, 743 P.2d 1323, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1987), the court held
that the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (the Commis-
sion) has no authority to impose punitive damages when resolving
employment discrimination disputes. Although punitive damages
have been upheld in a litigation context, the court determined that
section 12970(a) of the Government Code grants the Commission
only corrective and equitable powers. See Commodore Home Sys.,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 649 P.2d 912, 185 Cal. Rptr. 270
(1982); 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 863C (8th
ed. Supp. 1984).
Initially, a sex discrimination complaint was filed with the Depart-
ment of Fair Employment and Housing by a female employee of
Dyna-Med. The ultimate settlement included an agreement by the
employer to refrain from retaliatory action. However, five hours af-
ter executing the agreement, Dyna-Med discharged the employee. In
resolving the employee's newly-filed complaint, the Commission or-
dered back pay and $7,500 in punitive damages against Dyna-Med.
At issue on appeal was the Commission's statutory authority to im-
pose punitive damages in employment discrimination cases. Section
12970(a) provides that the Commission may "take such action, in-
cluding, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of em-
ployees, with or without back pay . . . as, in the judgment of the
commission" is necessary to eliminate discriminatory employment
practices. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12970(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988) (em-
phasis added). The court of appeal concluded that the imposition of
punitive damages is within the scope of this language.
To resolve the interpretation of section 12970(a), the court first ex-
amined the statutory language itself, in light of its legislative pur-
pose. The purpose of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (the
Act) is to provide effective remedies to eliminate discriminatory prac-
tices. See 1980 Cal. Stat. 3140 (codified in part at CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12900 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988)). The court noted that the sug-
gested remedies in section 12970(a) are exclusively corrective and eq-
uitable in nature-designed to make the employee "whole."
Consequently, the court concluded that had the Legislature intended
to authorize punitive damages, it would have expressly done so. See
generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional
Law §§ 426-30 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984); 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil
Rights §§ 223-25, 445 (1976); 12 CAL. JUR. 3D Civil Rights §§ 10-12
(1974 & Supp. 1987); 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Labor §§ 4-5 (1978 & Supp.
1987).
The court rejected the Commission's argument that the language
"including, but not limited to" enabled the Commission to impose pu-
nitive damages. The court acknowledged that punitive damages
would serve as a deterrent to employment discrimination. However,
were the Legislature's silence on this issue to be taken as a mandate,
every administrative agency with remedial powers would be entitled
to impose punitive damages. Therefore, the court preferred to inter-
pret the section as limiting the Commission's authority to corrective,
equitable remedies. Such interpretation would then be consistent
with section 3294(a) of the Civil Code, which allows punitive damages
only in cases of "oppression, fraud, or malice." See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3294(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1988). The court emphasized that the
Commission has sufficient authority to fashion appropriate remedies
without resorting to punitive damages. See 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 848-49 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984); 22
AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 236-42 (1965 & Supp. 1987); 23 CAL. JUR. 3D
Damages §§ 116-121 (1975 & Supp. 1987).
The court then found the Act's history ambiguous and, conse-
quently, of little guidance. Thus, the court compared the statutory
language to that found in section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982) (hereinafter NLRA), and in sec-
tion 706(g) of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (1982). Both sections have been interpreted by federal courts as
barring monetary remedies exclusive of back pay. See, e.g., Shah v.
Mt. Zion Hospital & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1981);
Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 837 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
Further, even though the NLRA and the Act have different pur-
poses, the court surmised that the Legislature's use of identical lan-
guage from the NLRA was intended to grant the Commission
equivalent authority.
The court also discounted the Commission's equal protection argu-
ment. The court reasoned that the availability of punitive damages in
administrative proceedings would hamper the conciliation process.
Moreover, a complainant is not precluded from seeking punitive
damages in an independent civil suit.
Thus, the court's withdrawal of the Commission's self-imposed au-
thority to award punitive damages in employment discrimination
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cases is a clear victory for employers. The court's cautious approach
to separation of powers issues bounces this ball right back to the leg-
islature. The court refuses to imply harsh remedies, such as punitive
damages, in the absence of sufficient support from the legislative his-
tory. Fortunately, however, with its broad remedial powers, the
Commission can still make retaliatory action by naive employers an
unpleasant option. See generally Gelb & Frankfurt, California's Fair
Employment and Housing Act: A Viable State Remedy for Employ-
ment Discrimination, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1055 (1983); 45B AM. JUR. 2D
Job Discrimination §§ 1740, 2428-31 (1986).
BARBARA A. BAYLISS
B. Prepayment injunctive relief in Board of Equalization
disputes is available only where the assessment is
completely without merit: Western Oil and Gas Association v.
State Board of Equalization.
In Western Oil and Gas Association v. State Board of Equalization,
44 Cal. 3d 208, 745 P.2d 1360, 242 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1987), the supreme
court unanimously reversed the trial court's decision to grant prepay-
ment injunctive relief to an oil industry association and seven oil
companies against the State Board of Equalization (the Board). The
Board required the oil companies to disclose certain information
pertaining to land and rights of way, in order to levy assessments on
inter-county pipelines. The plaintiffs opposed this disclosure require-
ment, and thus sought to enjoin its enforcement.
Until 1936, the Board based its authority for such disclosure on ar-
ticle XIII, section 19 of the California Constitution, which mandates
that the Board "annually assess pipelines . . . lying within 2 or more
counties .... " However, in 1936 the supreme court provided a com-
prehensive definition of pipeline for interpreting the constitutional
provision. See Pipe Line Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 5 Cal. 2d
253, 256-57, 54 P.2d 18, 20 (1936). This definition did not specifically
refer to land and rights of way; consequently, the Board abrogated
this disclosure requirement.
In 1982, the Board reimposed a right to assess lands and rights of
way by requiring companies to submit this information in their an-
nual property statements. Enforcement of this policy would be ef-
fected by assessing penalties for noncompliance with section 830(a) of
the Revenue and Taxation Code. The plaintiffs filed suit to prevent
compulsory disclosure of this information.
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the Board had
no authority to assess the companies' lands and rights of way. There-
fore the compulsory disclosure was unwarranted. The supreme court
reversed, holding that the Board's authority was not at issue. The
court ruled that article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution
bars the prepayment relief sought by the companies, since no legal or
equitable proceeding can impede the collection of a tax. The court
emphasized, however, that this section is broadly construed to limit
court intervention in tax collection matters. Only when the govern-
ment has no chance of prevailing on its claim will prepayment in-
junctive relief be available. See Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State
Board of Equalization, 27 Cal. 3d 277, 283 n.8, 611 P.2d 463, 467 n.8,
165 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126, n.8 (1980) (citing Enoch v. Williams Packing
Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962)). Accordingly, taxes must be paid first; then
an action may be maintained to recover them. See generally 51 CAL.
JUR. 3D Property Taxes § 206 (1979 & Supp. 1987). The court consid-
ered the Board's new policy to be wholly without merit, and thus re-
manded the action to the trial court for further factfinding.
LESLIE GLADSTONE
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A prosecutor's intimidation of defense witnesses by threat
of arrest following witness' testimony constitutes
governmental interference with defendant's constitutional
right to compulsory process: In re Martin.
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re Martin,' the court held that the prosecutor's intimidation
of defense witnesses violated the defendant's constitutional right to
produce witnesses in his favor.2 The court determined that a show-
ing of prosecutor misconduct was required to prove such interference
with the defendant's rights, but that bad faith or improper motives
were not required.3 The court concluded that prosecutor misconduct
was established by the arrest of the petitioner's first witness outside
1. 44 Cal. 3d 1, 744 P.2d 374, 241 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1987). The court opinion was
unanimous and authored by Justice Mosk.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; accord, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15. See also 21A AM. JUR.
2D Criminal Law §§ 717-19 (1981).
3. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 31, 744 P.2d at 393, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 282 (citing United
States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 1976)). However, conviction of the prose-
cutor under section 136.1 of the Penal Code requires specific intent to dissuade the wit-
ness from testifying. People v. Ford, 145 Cal. App. 3d 985, 989, 193 Cal. Rptr. 684, 689
(1983). See generally B.L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1986) (cited in
Edwards, Book Review, 7 PACE L. REV. 463, 464 (1987)); B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMES 800 (Supp. 1985).
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the courtroom immediately after testifying, and by informing other
witnesses that they would also be arrested for any crimes disclosed
by their testimony and in so doing, inducing them not to testify.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Martin was convicted of second degree murder and other crimes
based primarily on the testimony of Powell, who claimed that he
murdered the victim on Martin's behalf. Martin produced witnesses
to refute the testimony, but each witness was subject to self-incrimi-
nation by testifying. The first defense witness, Stephen Aguilar, tes-
tified that he and Powell were friends and that Powell had asked
him prior to the murder to obtain an unmarked gun for him. Aguilar
obtained the gun from his neighbor, Charles Riley,4 and gave it to
Powell. This testimony directly contradicted Powell's testimony that
the gun was obtained by Martin. Immediately after Aguilar testified,
the prosecutor had him arrested as an accessory to murder, in the
presence of three other defense witnesses5 and a news reporter, in
the hallway of the courthouse. The prosecution's investigator admit-
ted he knew that the witnesses were present when he made the
arrest. Aguilar was apparently never charged.6
Riley was subpoenaed to testify that he was the source of the gun,
corroborating Aguilar's testimony. The prosecutor refused to grant
immunity; therefore, Riley invoked the fifth amendment. Martin
called Eugene Wallace as a witness to testify that Wallace and Powell
were cellmates and that Wallace helped Powell fabricate the story
implicating Martin. The prosecutor again refused to grant immunity;
therefore, Wallace invoked the fifth amendment. John Gross was
also called by Martin. Gross' testimony would have established that
while he and Powell were cellmates, Powell admitted that Martin
was not a participant in the murder, that Powell obtained the gun
from Aguilar, and that he and Wallace had fabricated the story.
Again, no immunity was granted and Gross invoked his fifth amend-
ment rights. All three witnesses, Riley, Wallace, and Gross, were ini-
4. The identity of the neighbor was elicited during cross-examination of Aguilar.
Riley was subpoenaed and was one of the defense witnesses who refused to testify. His
testimony would have supported Aguilar's testimony that he had supplied the gun.
Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 20, 744 P.2d at 386, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
5. The prospective defense witnesses present all testified, but were not subject to
incrimination by doing so.
6. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 20, 744 P.2d at 385, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 274-75.
tially willing to testify and would have provided Martin's most
valuable defense.
Martin filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, together with a
motion to consolidate the appeal and the habeas proceeding. After
consolidating, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment and denied
the writ. Martin then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
California Supreme Court which was denied; Martin's subsequent pe-
tition was granted.7
III. THE COURT'S OPINION
Martin claimed relief on two grounds. The first was prosecutorial
interference with his constitutional right to present testimony at
trial. The second was the prosecution's introduction of false evi-
dence. The court appointed a referee to make findings of fact and
law. The referee. concluded that Martin was entitled to relief on both
grounds.
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden of proof is on the peti-
tioner.8 The court was satisfied that Martin had fulfilled his burden
as to the witness intimidation issue and therefore did not address the
false evidence ground for relief.
The court emphasized that pursuant to the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution, "a criminal defendant has the right 'to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' "9 Due
process mandates that the defendant have an opportunity to present
the essential elements of his case;10 and to present witnesses in
his defense." This right is also protected by the California Con-
stitution.12
The right to produce witnesses may be violated by governmental
interference.' 3 The court maintained that interference includes
prosecutorial intimidation of defense witnesses, such as making state-
ments to defense witnesses regarding prosecution for any crimes re-
vealed by their testimony,14 or arresting defense witnesses before
7. New facts were alleged in the second petition and supported by new exhibits,
allowing the court to grant the petition even though it had been previously denied. Id
at 27 n.3, 744 P.2d at 390 n.3, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 279 n.3.
8. In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 852, 372 P.2d 304, 306, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 474 (1962).
9. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 29, 744 P.2d at 391, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (quoting Westen,
The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 95 (1974)).
10. Id at 29, 744 P.2d at 391, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 280. See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95,
98 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
11. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
12. CAL. CONST. art. I § 15.
13. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 30, 744 P.2d at 392, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 281; see also B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES 800 (1963).
14. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 31, 744 P.2d at 392, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 281 (citing People v.
Warren, 161 Cal. App. 3d 961, 973, 207 Cal. Rptr. 912, 918 (1984)).
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they testify.15
The court acknowledged that evidence of bad faith or improper
motive on the part of the prosecution was not required.16 The de-
fendant must only establish misconduct and that this misconduct was
a "substantial cause" of his inability to present a witness.17 Finally,
the defendant must show that the testimony that would have been
given but for the interference was "'material and favorable to his
defense.' "18
The court held that the time, place, and manner of Aguilar's arrest
was improper. The evidence showed that a joint decision was made
between the prosecutor and the prosecution's investigator to arrest
Aguilar after he testified. 19 The investigator decided to have the
arrest take place in the hallway of the courthouse where three de-
fense witnesses were waiting to testify.2 0 News of the arrest was
broadcast and published in the local newspapers. The court felt it
was clear that the arrest, which was known to the three defense wit-
nesses who later refused to testify, "was of such character as 'to
transform [a defense witness] from a willing witness to one who
would refuse to testify.' "21 The court concluded that the arrest of
Aguilar was prosecutorial misconduct.22
The court further ruled that the prosecution, by engaging in mis-
conduct toward Riley, interfered with Martin's right to present wit-
nesses. When Riley appeared after being subpoenaed, the trial court
determined that he should seek counsel before testifying. The prose-
cutor informed Riley's attorney that he would arrest Riley if he testi-
fied. Additionally, the prosecutor's investigator asked Riley to
accompany him into the hallway. The court resolved that intimida-
tion had occurred, since even the prosecutor's factual account estab-
lished that Riley had been told he would be arrested if he implicated
15. Rd at 31, 744 P.2d at 393, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 282 (citing Bray v. Peyton, 429 F.2d
500, 501 (4th Cir. 1970)).
16. Id (citing United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 1976)).
17. 1& (citing Berg v. Morris, 483 F. Supp. 179, 184 (E.D. Cal. 1980); People v. War-
ren, 161 Cal. App. 3d 961, 974, 207 Cal. Rptr. 912, 919 (1984); People v. Bryant, 157 Cal.
App. 3d 582, 590, 203 Cal. Rptr. 733, 736 (1984)).
18. 1& at 32, 744 P.2d at 393, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 282 (quoting United States v.
Valenzuela Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).
19. 1& at 34, 744 P.2d at 395, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
20. Id
21. 1& at 35, 744 P.2d at 395, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 285 (quoting United States v. Smith,
478 F.2d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
22. Id, at 35, 744 P.2d at 395, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
himself in criminal activity.23 The court stated that it was "clearly
coercive" for a prosecutor to inform a witness of the likelihood of
prosecution due to his testimony.24
Moving to the intimidation of Wallace, the court determined that
he, too, had been subject to prosecutorial interference. Wallace had
contacted Martin's attorney and told him that he would reveal valua-
ble exculpatory information in return for money. Martin's attorney
contacted the prosecutor; the prosecutor's investigator was subse-
quently sent to interview Wallace. The investigator admitted to talk-
ing with Wallace about his involvement in extortion and the
likelihood that his testimony would result in criminal charges. Fol-
lowing Wallace's subpoena, the prosecutor told Wallace's counsel that
his testimony would lead to prosecution for any criminal acts dis-
closed. The prosecutor clearly indicated that the extortion would be
revealed on cross-examination. Thus the court similarly ruled that
Wallace was improperly threatened.25
Finally, the court concluded that prosecutorial interference also
existed with regard to Gross. Although the prosecution did not spe-
cifically threaten Gross, the court decided that the misconduct need
not be directed toward the witness individually.26 The court stated
flatly that the intimidation caused Gross not to testify. The court
noted that although Gross' testimony would not have incriminated
him since Gross was not a "criminal sophisticate," he could have rea-
sonably believed that testifying for the petitioner would adversely af-
fect his upcoming sentence in another case.27 The court concluded
that Martin sustained his burden of showing that the testimony was
material and that the prosecutorial misconduct was a substantial
cause of all three witnesses' failure to testify.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court concluded that Martin was entitled to relief for
prosecutorial misconduct. However, the court did not buy his argu-
ment that such misconduct warranted a dismissal of his case, 28 stat-
ing that while the misconduct was "serious," it was not "gross" as
23. Id, at 37, 744 P.2d at 397, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
24. Id, See also United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1979) (de-
fense witness threatened with retaliation in other cases pending against him); United
States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334, 335 (6th Cir. 1973) (defense witness told by secret ser-
vice agent that he would be prosecuted for a felony if he testified).
25. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 44-45, 744 P.2d at 401-02, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91.
26. Id at 49, 744 P.2d at 404, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
27. Id at 50, 744 P.2d at 405, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
28. The court reasoned that even in a habeas proceeding, the petitioner is subject
to retrial unless he has been "effectively acquitted of the offense in question." Id. at
53, 744 P.2d at 407, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
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required for a violation of due process.29 Although the distinction be-
tween serious and gross is unclear from the opinion, the misconduct
was sufficient for the court to remand the case.
A defendant's right to produce a defense is paramount. To allow
blatant intimidation, such as that which occurred in Martin, would
certainly impede the defendant's effectiveness in asserting this right.
Although the prosecutor had absolute discretion whether or not to
grant immunity, "'[a] simple no would have sufficed.' "30
LESLIE GLADSTONE
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Contemptuous status offenders may be incarcerated when
actions ignoring the court's order are egregious, less
restrictive alternatives would be ineffective, and the status
offender is segregated from juvenile delinquents during
incarceration: In re Michael G.
In In re Michael G., 44 Cal. 3d 283, 747 P.2d 1152, 243 Cal. Rptr. 224
(1988), the California Supreme Court held that a contemptuous sta-
tus offender could be incarcerated when certain criteria are met. The
petitioner, a minor, was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court for tru-
ancy and was ordered to attend school on a regular basis. There was
no dispute that the petitioner fully understood the court order and
willfully disobeyed it. As a result of his actions, the petitioner was
held in contempt of court and ordered to be incarcerated for forty-
eight hours. However, before enforcing the sentence, the court asked
the petitioner to seek review by writ to determine whether the court
had the power to incarcerate status offenders. Id. at 288, 747 P.2d at
1155, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 227. The Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appel-
late District denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the
supreme court then granted review.
There were two significant and conflicting policies the court con-
sidered in determining whether a contemptuous status offender could
be incarcerated. The first was an express legislative intent not to in-
29. Id, at 55, 744 P.2d at 409, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 298. Contra 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Crimi-
nal Law § 3232 n.56 (1985). The United States Supreme Court has held that compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses is so fundamental that it is incorporated in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 21A Am. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 718
(1981).
30. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 45, 744 P.2d at 402, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 291 (citation
omitted).
carcerate minors for merely being status offenders. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 601(b) (West 1984). A status offender, by definition, is a
minor who has committed an act which would not have been consid-
ered criminal if they had been an adult, but is determined to be unac-
ceptable behavior for someone their age. Id. at 287 n.2, 747 P.2d at
1154 n.2, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 226 n.2. The Legislature, in two statutes,
has addressed the issue of incarcerating status offenders. First, sec-
tion 601(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides: "it is the
intent of the Legislature that no minor who is adjudged a ward of the
court pursuant solely to this subdivision shall be removed from the
custody of the parent or guardian except during school hours." CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 601(b). Second, section 207(a) provides: "[n]o
minor shall be detained in any jail, lockup, juvenile hall, or other se-
cure facility who is taken into custody solely upon the ground that he
or she is a person described by section 601 or adjudged to be such or
made a ward of the juvenile court solely upon that ground. . . ." CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 207(a) (West Supp. 1988).
In contrast, all courts have an inherent power to impose penalties
upon individuals found in contempt of court because without this
power, courts cannot effectively enforce orders. In re Michael G., 44
Cal. 3d at 288, 747 P.2d at 1155, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 227. In California,
for example, an individual can be incarcerated for a maximum of five
days if held to be in contempt of court. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218
(West 1982).
In resolving this issue, the court first noted that section 213 un-
equivocally confers upon the juvenile court the power to hold indi-
viduals in contempt of court. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 213 (West
1984). The court next reasoned that because there are no express
special limitations as to the penalties the juvenile court can prescribe,
the sanctions set forth in section 1218 of the Code of Civil Procedure
are controlling. In re Michael G., 44 Cal. 3d at 289 n.3, 747 P.2d at
1155 n.3, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 227 n.3. Therefore, the court determined
that unless express statutory language indicates otherwise, the juve-
nile court must retain the fundamental power to incarcerate any in-
dividual who is held to be in contempt of court.
In analyzing the history of sections 207 and 601, the court specifi-
cally found no express statement to indicate that the Legislature in-
tended to impinge upon the juvenile court's contempt powers, and
further, the court refused to presume any intent. Id. at 294, 747 P.2d
at 1159, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 231. However, the court was careful not to
overrule a previous holding by the court of appeal in In re Ronald S.,
69 Cal. App. 3d 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1977). In that case, a status
offender disobeyed an order by the juvenile court and the offender
was found to be in violation of section 602 which expressly permitted
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the incarceration of minors due to the nature of the offenses covered
by the section. The appellate court reversed, expressly disapproving
of the "bootstrapping" procedure which transformed a status of-
fender into a juvenile delinquent for disobeying a court order. Id. at
870-71, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 390. The present court held that a contemp-
tuous status offender is not a section 602 ward and must be segre-
gated from juvenile delinquents when incarcerated. In re Michael G.,
44 Cal. 3d at 300, 747 P.2d at 1163, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
The court was also persuaded by the decisions of other state courts
which have held that contemptuous status offenders can be incarcer-
ated despite a legislative intent generally banning such detentions.
Id. at 296-97, 747 P.2d at 1154, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (citing Interest of
Darlene C., 278 S.C. 664, 301 S.E.2d 136 (1983)); State v. Norlund, 31
Wash. App. 725, 644 P.2d 724 (1982); In re G.B., 88 Ill. 2d 36, 430
N.E.2d (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 963 (1981); and State ex rel.
L.E.A. v. Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1980). In particular,
the court noted the Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding in Interest of
D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d 168, 327 N.W.2d 682 (1983). It adopted that court's
standard for determining whether a status offender may be found in
contempt of court and incarcerated: "(1) the juvenile is given suffi-
cient notice to comply with the order and understands its provisions;
(2) the violation of the court order is egregious; (3) less restrictive al-
ternatives were considered and found to be ineffective; and (4) spe-
cial confinement conditions are arranged consistent with . . . [the
statutory provisions barring intermingling with delinquents]." In re
Michael G., 44 Cal. 3d at 297, 747 P.2d at 1161, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
(quoting Interest of D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d at 182, 327 N.W.2d at 689).
The court emphasized the soundness of such qualifications and ad-
monished adherence to them. Id.
The decision in the present case was the most reasonable and logi-
cal in light of the dilemma confronted by the court. From a public
policy standpoint, a status offender should not be incarcerated simply
because the acts committed would not have been deemed criminal
had the minor been an adult. However, the very dignity of our judi-
cial system is undermined if a court is powerless to enforce its orders
effectively against status offenders. The standard announced by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court and adopted by this court preserves the
power of the court and at the same time recognizes the policy consid-
erations addressed in sections 201 and 601. The court will incarcerate
a contemptuous status offender in only the most limited of circum-
stances. Additionally, the court requires status offenders to be kept
physically separate from juvenile delinquents during incarceration.
The dangers contemplated by the legislature are thereby minimized,
if not altogether eliminated, by the adoption of the Wisconsin
standard.
RONALD PAUL SCHRAMM
B. A convicted felon who has been honorably discharged from
the Youth Authority pursuant to section 1772 of the
California Welfare and Institution Code is nevertheless
permanently prohibited from carrying a concealed firearm:
People v. Bell.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Bell,1 the California Supreme Court affirmed both the
conviction and death penalty sentence for the defendant 2 in a special
circumstance murder.3 In reaching its determination, the court clari-
fied three separate areas of the law. First, the court unequivocally
stated that a defendant must prove all three elements of the D)uren4
standard to establish a prima facie case that a jury was not drawn
from a fair cross-section of the community. 5 Second, it reaffirmed
that prosecutorial misconduct will constitute reversible error only
when the probable result of the case would have been different if the
prosecutor refrained from the statement or action.6 Finally, in a case
of first impression, the court held that a convicted felon, who has
subsequently been honorably discharged from the Youth Authority,
is still prohibited from carrying a concealable firearm. 7
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The defendant, Ronald Lee Bell, was accused of murder and at-
tempted murder during the commission of a robbery. Bell, who had
been convicted of a. previous felony,8 was also accused of violating
1. 44 Cal. 3d 137, 745 P.2d 573, 241 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1987) (en banc). Justice Mosk
wrote the majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Panelli, Eagleson,
and Kaufman concurring. Justices Broussard and Arguelles each authored separate
concurring and dissenting opinions.
2. Id at 144, 745 P.2d at 575, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
3. At the time the murder was committed, section 190.2(c)(3)(i) of the California
Penal Code stated that a murder occurring during the commission of a robbery consti-
tutes special circumstances, and the penalty, if the defendant was convicted, was either
death or confinement in a state prison for life without the possibility of parole. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(3)(i) (1977) (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)
(17)(i) (West Supp. 1988)).
4. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979); see infra note 22.
5. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 148-49, 745 P.2d at 578-79, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 895-96.
6. Id at 151, 745 P.2d at 579, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 896-97.
7. Id at 161, 745 P.2d at 587, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
8. Bell was convicted of voluntary manslaughter ten years earlier when he fa-
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section 12021 of the California Penal Code9 which prohibits convicted
felons from carrying concealed firearms.O The defendant's principal
contention was that the prosecution's three eyewitnesses were mis-
taken in their identifications because his brother, Larry, was the ac-
tual perpetrator of the crimes. However, two of the witnesses
testified that they personally knew the defendant and all three
claimed that they were familiar with his brother, Larry."
At trial, the defense attempted to prove that Larry Bell was a via-
ble suspect and that the eyewitnesses' identifications were unreliable.
They presented evidence which tended to show that Larry Bell had
the opportunity to perpetrate the crime because he left his hotel
room for forty-five minutes at approximately the same time the rob-
bery occurred.12 Further, the police found a ring in Larry's posses-
sion which they believed was stolen during the incident. The defense
also presented Dr. Robert Shomer, an expert in eyewitness identifica-
tion, who testified that the expectations and motivations of the wit-
nesses were seriously affected by numerous factors,13 including the
fact that the defendant had ten years earlier murdered Alcus Dorton,
a relative of all three witnesses. However, the defense conspicuously
failed to introduce Larry Bell to the jury. This was especially signifi-
cant in light of the fact that there was conflicting evidence as to
whether the two brothers actually looked similar.
The jury found the defendant guilty on all charges, 14 and because
the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery which con-
stituted special circumstances as then enumerated in section
tally shot Alcus Dorton, who was the father of an eyewitness in the present case. I&
at 145 n.2, 745 P.2d at 576 n.2, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 893 n.2.
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021 (West 1982).
10. Id, ("Any person who has been convicted of a felony... [and] who owns or has
in his possession... [any] firearm capable of being concealed upon the person is guilty
of a public offense .... ).
11. Ernestine Jackson testified that she attended school with the defendant from
1962-1969 and lived in the same neighborhood as the Bell family. Ruby Judge, who
was only fourteen years old at the time of the incident, claimed to know both brothers.
The third witness, Dorothy Dorton, whose father was killed by the defendant in a sep-
arate incident, did not know him personally, but knew his brother. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at
146, 745 P.2d at 576, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
12. The robbery occurred at approximately 4:00 p.m. Marilyn Mitchell testified
that she spent the day in question with Larry Bell at a motel but that he left the room
for 30 to 45 minutes at about the time it was becoming dark outside. Id at 146-47, 745
P.2d at 577, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
13. Dr. Shomer discussed seven factors which he believed made the identification
of the eyewitnesses highly unreliable. Id at 147, 745 P.2d at 577, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
14. Id. at 144, 745 P.2d at 575, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
190.2(c)(3)(i) of the California Penal Code,15 they imposed a death
sentence. The defendant was, therefore, automatically entitled to an
appeal under section 1239(b) of the California Penal Code.16
III. MAJORITY OPINION
The majority addressed several procedural and substantive issues
raised by the defendant on appeal, including: 1) whether the defend-
ant was denied his constitutional right to a representative jury; 2)
whether the verdict should be reversed because of various instances
of prosecutorial misconduct; and 3) whether section 12021 of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code17 applies to convicted felons who have subse-
quently been honorably discharged from the Youth Authority.
A. Representative Jury and the Duren Standard
In Taylor v. Louisiana,18 the United States Supreme Court de-
clared that "the American concept of the jury trial contemplates a
jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community."' 9 The de-
fendant contended that the jury selection procedures employed by
Contra Costa County systematically excluded blacks from venires
and thereby deprived him of his right to a representative jury. As ev-
idence of this violation, the defendant relied on the decision in People
v. Buford,20 where the court of appeal found that there was a signifi-
cant disparity between the number of blacks in the community and
the number of blacks in the jury panels under consideration.21 The
majority was unpersuaded by this argument.
The court authoritatively held that in order to demonstrate that
there has been a violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the
defendant must establish each element of the standard set forth in
Duren v. Missouri.22 In the present case, the defendant failed to pro-
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(3)(i) (1977) (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a)(17)(i) (West Supp. 1988)).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West 1982). This section provides: "When upon
any plea a judgment of death is rendered, an appeal is automatically taken by the de-
fendant without any action taken by him or his counsel." Id
17. Cal. Penal Code § 12021 (West 1982).
18. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
19. Id at 527.
20. 132 Cal. App. 3d 288, 182 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1982). Bz ford also originated in Con-
tra Costa County.
21. Id. at 296, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
22. 439 U.S. 357 (1979). The three elements that are necessary to establish a prima
facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement are as follows:
1) that the group alleged to be excused is a "distinctive" group in the comm-
unity;
2) that the representation of this group in the venires from which juries are
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons
in the community; and
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duce the necessary statistical evidence to establish that the number
of blacks in the venire from which the jury was selected was not fair
and reasonable in relation to the number of blacks in the commu-
nity.23 The court further held that the defendant could not rely on
the evidence presented in Buford to establish this element.24
The defendant alternatively contended that he was not required to
prove that the venire was unrepresentative to establish a prima facie
violation of a fair cross-section requirement. The defendant relied on
the court's holding in People v. Harris25 as precedent for his position.
In Harris, the court found that the jury pool as a whole was unrepre-
sentative because it was compiled from a list of registered voters and
the proportion of minorities who failed to register was larger than
that for the general public. 26 The Harris court concluded that suffi-
cient evidence existed to establish that the pool from which juries
were selected was unrepresentative. 27 The defendant's reliance on
Harris was erroneous because he did not challenge the composition
of the pool. Therefore, proof of the unrepresentative nature of the
venire was required under the second prong of the Duren standard.28
Thus, the majority held that he could not maintain that there was a
violation of the fair-cross-section requirement.29
B. The Fffect of Prosecutorial Misconduct
The defendant contended that certain actions and statements made
by the prosecutor during the course of the trial constituted miscon-
duct, and therefore the verdict should have been reversed. However,
a finding of prosecutorial misconduct does not automatically consti-
tute reversible error.30 The defendant argued that the court should
apply the reasonable doubt standard stated in Chapman v. Califor-
3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group
in the jury selection process.
Id at 364. As mentioned in the text, the California Supreme Court unquestionably ap-
proved the Duren standard. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 148-49, 745 P.2d at 578, 241 Cal. Rptr. at
895.
23. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 149, 745 P.2d at 578-79, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 895-96.
24. Id.
25. 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 965 (1984).
26. Id. at 52, 679 P.2d at 441, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
27. Id. at 58, 679 P.2d at 445, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 794-95.
28. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 149, 745 P.2d at 579, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
29. Id,
30. See 5 CAL. JUR. 3D Appellate Review § 545 (1973). "Not every error occurring
in a legal proceeding is so serious as to vitiate the action of the trial court and warrant
reversal of its judgment or order." Id.
nia 31 to determine if the prosecutorial misconduct was prejudicial
and thereby required reversal. However, the court held that the
Chapman standard is only controlling when federal constitutional er-
ror is involved,32 and since the instances of misconduct complained of
in this proceeding were of an evidentiary nature, the reasonable
doubt standard was not applicable.33 Instead, the court adopted the
following standard: "Prosecutorial misconduct is cause for reversal
only when it is 'reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
the defendant would have occurred had the district attorney re-
frained from the comment attacked by the defendant.' "34
The court applied the standard outlined above to the specific in-
stances where prosecutorial misconduct was found and held that
there were no grounds for reversal.35 The first instance of miscon-
duct complained of by the defendant was when the prosecutor vio-
lated a pre-trial stipulation by reading a statement made by an
unidentified informant while cross-examining a witness.36 Although
the court found that the prosecutor's actions clearly constituted mis-
conduct, the statement was not prejudicial because other testimony
heard by the jury established that the defendant owned a gun, and
the judge had also admonished the jury to disregard the statement. 37
The second instance in which the court found misconduct was when
the prosecutor repeatedly quoted People v. Guzman 3 8 out of context.
In particular, the prosecutor tried to mislead the jury into believing
that the Guzman court held that the testimony of the defendant's ex-
pert witness was tantamount to the testimony of polygraph opera-
tors, hypnotists, and truth-drug administrators. 39 The court held that
although the comments were improper, it was unlikely that their ef-
fect was prejudicial, thus reversal was not required.40
The court found other instances of prosecutorial misconduct which
31. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
32. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 151, 745 P.2d at 580, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 151, 745 P.2d at 579, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 896-97 (quoting People v.
Beivelman, 70 Cal. 2d 60, 75, 447 P.2d 913, 921, 73 Cal. Rptr. 521, 529 (1968) (en banc)).
35. See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
36. The statement read by the prosecutor was: "Suspect had been observed in pos-
session of a small-barrelled gun and was cleaning the weapon the day before the
crime." Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 150, 745 P.2d at 579, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
37. Id. at 151, 745 P.2d at 580, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
38. 47 Cal. App. 3d 380, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1975).
39. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 153-54, 745 P.2d at 581-82, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 898-99. The court,
in a footnote, made reference to People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 377, 690 P.2d 709,
727, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 254 (1984), which clearly recognized the importance of qualified
expert testimony on the subject of eyewitness identification. Further, the court disap-
proved of the comments made in Guzman to the extent that they were in conflict with
the holding in McDonald. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 154 n.5, 745 P.2d at 582 n.5, 241 Cal. Rptr.
at 899 n.5.
40. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 154, 745 P.2d at 582, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
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occurred during closing and rebuttal arguments as well as during the
penalty phase of the trial.41 However, in each instance defense coun-
sel failed to make a timely objection and, therefore, under the princi-
ple announced in People v. Green,42 the point could not be raised for
the first time on appeal. 43 The defendant argued that Green applies
only to the guilt phase of a trial and not to prosecutorial misconduct
that occurs during the penalty phase of a capital trial. The court dis-
agreed and reiterated the policy underlying the Green decision that
the trial court should be given the opportunity to correct the abuses
by a prosecutor, which can only be realized if the defendant makes a
timely objection.44
C. Application of section 12021
The defendant was convicted of violating section 12021 of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code,45 which prohibits a convicted felon from possess-
ing concealable firearms.46 The defendant contended that section
12021 should not apply because he was honorably discharged from
the Youth Authority. Section 1772(a) of the Welfare and Institutions
Code 47 provides that a person honorably discharged from the Youth
Authority will be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting
from the crimes which he committed.48 Therefore, the issue
41. See id at 154-57, 163-66, 745 P.2d at 582-84, 588-90, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 899-901,
905-07.
42. 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980).
43. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 154, 745 P.2d at 582, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 899. The court recog-
nized that the defendant could make a valid objection on appeal if it could be demon-
strated that the error could not have been corrected by appropriate instructions. Id.
However, each instance of prosecutorial misconduct that was established could have
been corrected. Id. at 155-57, 163-66, 745 P.2d at 582-84, 588-90, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 899-
901, 905-07.
44. Id. at 164, 745 P.2d at 588-89, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021 (West 1982).
46. Id See supra note 10 for text of the pertinent parts of the statute.
47. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1772(a) (West 1984).
48. Id. Section 1772(a) of the California Welfare and Institutions Code provides:
Every person honorably discharged from control by the Youthful Offender
Parole Board who has not, during the period of control by the authority been
placed by the authority in a state prison shall thereafter be released from all
penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime for which he or
she was committed, and every person discharged may petition the court which
committed him or her, and the court may upon such petition set aside the ver-
dict of guilty and dismiss the accusation or information against the petitioner
who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting
from the offense or crime for which he or she was committed, including, but
not limited to, any disqualification for any employment or occupational li-
cense, or both, created by any other provision of law.
presented was whether possession of a concealable firearm is a pen-
alty or disability within the meaning of section 1772(a).
The majority first examined the underlying public policy consider-
ations of the two statutes involved. The Youth Authority Act was
designed to "protect the public by subjecting youthful offenders to re-
habilitation rather than retributive punishment...."49 Section 12021
was enacted, on the other hand, as part of a scheme designed to pro-
tect the public from the danger that is manifested from a convicted
felon carrying a firearm.50
From these policy considerations, the majority determined that de-
nying a convicted felon the right to carry firearms is a frivolous bur-
den, especially in light of the counterveiling public safety concerns.5 1
The court also found that permitting convicted felons to carry fire-
arms is inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the Youth Author-
ity Act.52 Next, the court recognized that the Legislature has not
created any exceptions to section 12021 for any person who has been
convicted of a dangerous weapon felony.5 3 Finally, the court rea-
soned that since not even a gubernatorial pardon can restore a per-
son's privilege to carry a concealed firearm, it is highly unlikely that
the Legislature intended to reinstate a privilege that it expressly de-
nies under the pardoning power.54
IV. THE SEPARATE OPINIONS
A. Justice Broussard's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Broussard strongly disagreed with the majority's interpre-
tation of section 1772. He argued that the statute expressly states
that when a person is honorably discharged from the Youth Author-
ity he is released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the
crime.55 Because this language is clear and unambiguous, Justice
Broussard contended that the court should not have judicially con-
strued the statute.5 6 Therefore, a convicted felon who receives an
honorable discharge should be released from the prohibitions im-
Id.
49. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 160, 745 P.2d at 586, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 903 (citing People v.
Navarro, 7 Cal. 3d 248, 497 P.2d 481, 102 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1972)).
50. Id. at 161, 745 P.2d at 586-87, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 903-04.
51. Md at 161, 745 P.2d at 587, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 161-62, 745 P.2d at 587, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 904; see CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) (successful probationers still subject to prohibitions
of section 12021).
54. I& at 162, 745 P.2d at 587, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
55. Id. at 171, 745 P.2d at 593, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
56. ld,
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posed by section 12021 of the Penal Code.57
Alternatively, Justice Broussard argued that even if the language
of section 1772 was ambiguous, the majority erred in their construc-
tion of the statute.5 8 He contended that because there were two pos-
sible constructions of the statute, it is the policy of the state to
construe the section in a light most favorable to the defendant.5 9 In a
formal opinion, the Attorney General stated that section 1772 re-
leases an honorable dischargee from the prohibitions of section
12021.60 Additionally, the court had previously interpreted section
1203.4 of the Penal Code,61 which is similar to section 1772, as permit-
ting convicted felons who successfully complete probation to be re-
lieved of the strictures of section 12021.62 Therefore, the Justice
believed that the majority's construction of section 1772 was contrary
to the policy of the state.63
Justice Broussard next noted that the Legislature had amended
the Youth Authority Act subsequent to judicial interpretation 64 of
the language in question.65 He cited South Dakota v. Brown 66 and
People v. Curtis67 for the proposition: "When the Legislature amends
a statute without changing language which has been judicially con-
57. Id. at 172, 745 P.2d at 594, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
58. Id at 172, 745 P.2d at 594, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
59. Id at 172-73, 745 P.2d at 594-95, 241 Cal. Rptr. 912.
60. 32 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 43, 44, 46 (1958).
61. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 1982).
62. See People v. Banks, 53 Cal. 2d 370, 388, 348 P.2d 102, 114, 1 Cal. Rptr. 669, 681
(1959) (en banc) ("[D]efendant would remain classified as one convicted of a felony
within the meaning of section 12021 of the Penal Code ... until defendant successfully
completed probation and received the statutory rehabilitation provided for by section
1203.4 of the Penal Code."). In People v. Taylor, 178 Cal. App. 2d 472, 479, 3 Cal. Rptr.
186, 190 (1960), the court of appeal found:
If one .. . has fulfilled the requirements of probation and secured a release
under section 1203.4, it is a fair inference that such a person should also be
released from that class of convicted felons to which section 12021 is applica-
ble and should be restored to the right to possess a revolver .. "
63. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 172-73, 745 P.2d at 594-95, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 912 (Broussard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
64. See supra note 62.
65. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 174, 745 P.2d at 595, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
66. 20 Cal. 3d 765, 576 P.2d 473, 144 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1978). The court in Brown indi.
cated that "as a general rule, . . . when the Legislature enacts a law 'framed in the
identical language' of a previous law on the same subject, it is presumed that the new
law has the same fundamental meaning as the old law." Id. at 774, 476 P.2d at 479, 144
Cal. Rptr. at 764.
67. 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969). The Curtis court stated,
"The rule of law is well established where the Legislature uses terms already judi-
cially construed, 'the presumption is almost irresistible that it used them in the precise
strued, it is presumed that the Legislature intended to adopt the
prior judicial construction."68 He therefore argued that the prior ju-
dicial interpretations of the term "all penalties and disabilities" 69
should be controlling in the present case.70
Finally, Justice Broussard disagreed with the majority's affirma-
tion of the death penalty sentence. He argued that the jury might
have considered the defendant's violation of section 12021 as aggra-
vating the basic special circumstances murder offense, possibly a sig-
nificant factor in determining the defendant's sentence.71 Therefore,
since Justice Broussard believed that the conviction of violating sec-
tion 12021 was erroneous, he would have reversed the death penalty
judgment.72
B. Justice Arguelles' concurring and dissenting opinion
Justice Arguelles agreed with Justice Broussard that the defendant
did not violate section 12021.73 He agreed with the Attorney Gen-
eral's formal opinion, concluding that an honorable dischargee from
the Youth Authority is relieved of the penalties and disabilities im-
posed by section 12021.74 Justice Arguelles argued that the court
should apply section 1772 as previously interpreted; if such applica-
tion is contrary to policy considerations, then the Legislature should
amend it. 75
V. CONCLUSION
The court's decision to prohibit honorable dischargees from carry-
ing concealed firearms demonstrates its strong concern for public
safety. This decision does not hinder the rehabilitative purposes of
section 1772 and is consistent with the Legislature's uniform denial of
this privilege to convicted felons. By reaffirming the Duren stan-
dard, the court has unambiguously stated that statistical evidence is
necessary to establish that a jury was unrepresentative. The court's
and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts'." Id, at 355, 450
P.2d at 38, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
68. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 174, 745 P.2d at 595, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
69. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
70. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 174-75, 745 P.2d at 595-96, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13 (Broussard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
71. Id. at 176, 745 P.2d at 597, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
72. IML
73. Id. at 176, 745 P.2d at 597, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 914 (Arguelles, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Arguelles concurred in the majority opinion in all other respects,
including the affirmation of the death penalty sentence. Id. at 177, 745 P.2d at 597-98,
241 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
74. See Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. supra note 60 at 44, 46.
75. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 177, 745 P.2d at 597, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 914 (Arguelles, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
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decision to impose a relatively high standard of review for determin-
ing reversible error in instances where there has been prosecutorial
misconduct is consistent with its previous holdings. There is no pre-
cedent to adopt a reasonable doubt standard when the error assigned
is only evidentiary in nature. Finally, by extending the holding of
Green, which prohibits a defendant from raising a contention of
prosecutorial misconduct when not originally objected to during the
trial, to the penalty phase of the proceeding, the court demonstrated
its reluctance to reverse a decision if the error could have been cor-
rected by the trial court.
RONALD PAUL SCHRAMM
C. During voir dire, the evidence of a discriminatory pattern
of juror exclusion imposes a duty on the court to demand
justification from counsel: People v. Snow.
In People v. Snow, 44 Cal. 3d 216, 746 P.2d 452, 242 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1987), the court reversed the defendant's conviction of first degree
murder because of the prosecution's misuse of peremptory chal-
lenges. During the course of the voir dire, the prosecution perempto-
rily challenged sixteen prospective jurors, six of whom were black.
The trial court rejected defense counsel's repeated requests to de-
mand justification from the prosecutor that the challenges were non-
discriminatory in nature. The trial court indicated it was unsure of
applicable case law and would reserve judgment. The prosecutor ar-
gued that the restriction on peremptory challenges applied to both
parties, noting that the defendant had not excused any blacks. No
ruling was given on the defendant's reserved motion and the defend-
ant's next motion was denied without comment. Ultimately, six
black prospective jurors were peremptorily challenged. The final
panel contained two black jurors.
The court dismissed as plain error the prosecutor's argument that
his peremptory challenges, even if wrongful, were justified by the de-
fendant's lack of exclusion of blacks. The propriety of the prosecu-
tor's actions stands on its own merits, and is not to be evaluated in
light of the defendant's challenges. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d
258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
Use of peremptory challenges to exclude an identifiable group of
persons simply because of a presumed group bias is improper.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890; see also Peo-
ple v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d 296, 583 P.2d 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978)
(dismissal of prospective black jurors based on race is improper); Peo-
ple v. Lewis, 144 Cal. App. 3d 267, 192 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1983) (no abso-
lute right to a jury of one's own race). To allow the prosecution to
circumvent proper procedure by accepting two black jurors, thus
stopping short of total exclusion, would provide an easy means of jus-
tifying unlawful discrimination. Consequently, the court disapproved
People v. Davis, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1177, 234 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1987),
which suggested that the presence of two or three blacks on the jury
precluded the defense from establishing discriminatory exclusion.
The court concluded that the defendant had established a prima facie
case of group bias, Thus, as six years had passed since the voir dire
examination, the court held the error reversible per se under
Wheeler, rather than remand for prosecutorial justification. See Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 (1986).
The court then gave an advisory opinion as to the nonassertive con-
duct evidence admitted at trial. The prosecutor had testified that on
the eve of trial, in the defendant's presence, he discussed the victim's
murder. The prosecutor said that the defendant had not seemed sur-
prised. The trial court, assuming that the defendant had heard this
conversation, deemed this to be an admission by silence. The
supreme court considered this inference improper, as there was no
accusation for the defendant to admit or deny. However, the court
found this evidence admissible for another purpose, namely, that the
defendant had prior knowledge of the killing..
Although federal law and other state laws are contrary, in Wheeler
the California Supreme Court held that the right to an impartial jury
drawn from a representative cross-section is a fundamental safeguard
of the California Declaration of Rights. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 160; see
47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 235 (1969 & Supp. 1987). Thus, the state con-
stitution should govern rather than Supreme Court cases because it
provides more protection (which the states may do) against improper
jury selection. Sufficient evidence is established when an opponent
has struck most or all members of the identified group from the ve-
nire. See 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3018 (rev. ed. 1985 & Supp.
1987) (emphasis added). Thus, maintaining a token representation of
a minority group on the jury without justification will be considered
improper conduct.
LESLIE GLADSTONE
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IV. EVIDENCE
On appeal, an evidentiary hearing is not required where
the decision of the defense counsel not to present
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase was the result of
a reasonably informed and competent tactical decision:
People v. Miranda.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Miranda,' the supreme court considered numerous as-
signments of error encompassing both the guilt and penalty phases of
a jury trial in which the defendant was convicted of first degree mur-
der with special circumstances and sentenced to death under the 1978
death penalty law. The court dealt with the consolidation of the de-
fendant's mandatory appeal and petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The supreme court affirmed both the trial court's judgment of guilt
and its imposition of the death penalty. The court also denied the de-
fendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The defendant, Adam Miranda, and the codefendant, Arnold Gon-
zales, went into a 7-Eleven store. After the clerk refused to sell them
beer due to the late hour, the defendant reached into his belt and
grabbed the handle of a gun. The clerk managed to dissuade the de-
fendant from committing the robbery. The defendant and Gonzales
then entered an AM-PM market. Again their request to purchase
beer was denied. This prompted the defendant to point his gun at
the clerk and order him to put money into a bag. Gonzales noticed
that they were being recorded by the market's security camera. Mo-
ments later, the defendant shot and killed the clerk.
At the time of the arrest, the officers removed both a handgun and
a pocketknife from the pocket of the defendant's pants. A later
search conducted at the police station produced an unsealed envelope
containing an incriminating letter. The defendant was questioned
and then placed in a jail cell containing hidden microphones which
recorded the defendant's confession. Along with the security record-
ings from both markets, the jail cell tapes were admitted into
1. 44 Cal. 3d 57, 744 P.2d 1127, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1987). Justice Panelli wrote the
majority opinion with Justices Arguelles, Eagleson, Kaufman, and Chief Justice Lucas
concurring. Justice Broussard wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion with
Justice Mosk concurring.
evidence.2
The defendant and Gonzales were found guilty of first degree mur-
der, attempt to commit murder, and burglary.3 The jury made a spe-
cial finding that the murder of the clerk "was willful, deliberate and
premeditated and that the killing occurred as a result of the attempt
to commit the crime of robbery."4
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. The Guilt Phase
The defendant claimed that his constitutional right to represent
himself as co-counsel was violated pursuant to Faretta v. State.5 The
court held that Faretta did not apply because the holding specifically
addressed a defendant's right to present his own defense-it did not
resolve the question of whether a defendant has a constitutional right
to act as co-counsel.6 Looking to pre-Faretta cases for assistance, the
court held that it is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to
determine if a represented party may take part in the presentation of
his own case.7
The defendant also contended that the trial court acted improperly
when it denied his request to substitute counsel because the court
never thoroughly investigated the factual foundation of his request.8
While the court agreed with the defendant that People v. Marsden9
governed the situation, the court found that the trial court's action
did not "deny the defendant an opportunity to enumerate specific ex-
amples of inadequate representation."10 Therefore, the supreme
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not al-
2. In addition to the evidence of the market incidents, evidence as to a prior rob-
bery, for which the defendant was never convicted, was introduced. Id at 73, 744 P.2d
at 1135, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 602-03. The defendant claimed that the two offenses were
misjoined. The court dismissed this contention holding that: (1) the defendant's failure
to object to the joinder at trial constituted a waiver of his right to object; and (2) that
due to the strength of mini-market murder evidence, mention of the robbery charge of
which the defendant was acquitted could not have produced prejudice. Id. at 77-78, 744
P.2d at 1138-39, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 605-06.
3. Id. at 74, 744 P.2d at 1136, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
4. Id. at 74-75, 744 P.2d at 1136, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 603-04.
5. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). See Note, The Right of Self-Representation in the Capital
Case, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 130 (1985).
6. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 75, 744 P.2d at 1137, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (citation
omitted).
7. Id. at 75-76, 744 P.2d at 1137, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 604. See generally B. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 337 (1963); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D, pt. 1, Criminal Law
§ 2945 (rev. ed. 1985).
8. The grounds for the defendant's request for change of attorney was that his
attorney "'don't know how to do nothing.' "Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 76, 744 P.2d at 1137,
241 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
9. 2 Cal. 3d 118, 465 P.2d 44, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970).
10. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 76, 744 P.2d at 1138, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
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lowing a substitution of attorney."
The defendant made three assignments of error regarding the jury
selection procedure. First, the defendant asserted that he was
prejudiced because jurors opposed to the death penalty were ex-
cluded from the jury, thereby denying him "a representative cross
section of the community."12 This assertion, however, had been re-
jected in People v. Fields.IS Second, the defendant contended that
the failure to empanel separate juries for each phase of the bifur-
cated trial was violative of his state and federal constitutional rights.
The court similarly dismissed this contention as it also had been re-
jected previously.14 Finally, the defendant alleged that the District
Attorney's use of peremptory challenges was violative of the state
constitution in that the exclusion of prospective jurors who may dis-
favor the death penalty constituted a systematic exclusion. Once
again, the court noted that this issue had already been decided.15
The court next considered the defendant's assertion that the trial
court committed error by admitting into evidence the letter obtained
pursuant to the search conducted when he was booked. The defend-
ant claimed that his counsel was incompetent because his counsel
failed to move for suppression of the letter before the trial as re-
quired by section 1538.5 of the Penal Code.16 The court found this
argument to be without merit, as the letter was the product of a law-
ful booking search.17
11. Id. at 77, 744 P.2d at 1139, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 606 (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 78-79, 744 P.2d at 1139, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
13. 35 Cal. 3d 329, 349, 673 P.2d 680, 692, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 815 (1983) (plurality
opinion), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984). See generally Comment, Sentencing By
Death Qualified Juries and the Right to Jury Nullification, 22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 289
(1985).
14. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 79, 744 P.2d at 1139, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 606 (citing Lockert
v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986)); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301,
168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980). See generally, B. WrTKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 400C (Supp. Part I 1985); Note, Lockert v. McCree: Conviction-Proneness and the
Constitutionality of Death-QualifiediJuries, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 287 (1986).
15. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 80, 744 P.2d at 1140, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 607 (citing People
v. Zimmerman, 36 Cal. 3d 154, 680 P.2d 776, 202 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1984)). See generally
Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Oallenge Practices In Capital Cases: An Empirical
Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1982).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(h) (West 1982). The supreme court rejected the de-
fendant's appellate challenge to the introduction of the letter as untimely. Miranda,
44 Cal. 3d at 80-81, 744 P.2d at 1140, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
17. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 81-82, 744 P.2d at 1141, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 608. The de-
fendant contended that the envelope constituted a closed container and that prying
into the contents unlawfully intruded into his privacy. The court disagreed, believing
that "[a] search of the personal effects of an arrested person at the time of booking is a
reasonable search under the California and federal constitutions." Id. at 81, 744 P.2d at
Regarding the introduction of evidence concerning the 7-Eleven
store incident, the defendant alleged that such evidence was improp-
erly admitted because it constituted "impermissible evidence of an
uncharged attempted robbery"18 pursuant to section 1101 of the Evi-
dence Code.19 While the court acknowledged that the admission of
this evidence without a limiting instruction constituted error, it con-
sidered this error harmless.20
The next evidentiary contention lodged by the defendant was that
permitting the jail cell tape to be introduced into evidence was viola-
tive of his right of privacy, the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, and the sixth amendment right to counsel. The
court found the defendant's reliance on De Lancie v. Superior
Court 21 for the creation of a privacy interest to be misplaced because
in Donaldson v. Superior Court,22 the court held that De Lancie was
inapplicable to acts conducted before De Lancie was filed.23 Finally,
the court rejected the defendant's evidentiary assignment of error
that a sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel viola-
tion occurred. The court held that the defendant's counsel's failure
to raise the fifth amendment issue could not have prejudiced the de-
fendant because the "right to counsel is not implicated where an ac-
cused voluntarily makes statements to a cellmate, who is not acting
as a government agent or informant."24
The court then focused upon the sufficiency of the evidence which
established premeditation and deliberation. The court looked to the
three categories set forth in People v. Anderson25 for sustaining a
finding of premeditated murder. Regarding the first category-prior
1141, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 608 (citations omitted). For a thorough definition of the parame-
ters of booking and inventory searches see 2 W.B. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 5.3(a) (2d ed. 1987).
18. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 82, 744 P.2d at 1141, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
19. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 1985).
20. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 83, 744 P.2d at 1142, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
21. 31 Cal. 3d 865, 647 P.2d 142, 183 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1982) (a person in jail may have
a reasonable expectation of privacy).
22. 35 Cal. 3d 24, 39, 672 P.2d 110, 119, 196 Cal. Rptr. 704, 713 (1983).
23. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 85, 744 P.2d at 1143-44, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 611. In addi-
tion, an expectation of privacy was probably not reasonable because the defendant was
repeatedly told by Gonzales that the cells were bugged. Id. at 85 n.10, 744 P.2d at 1114
n.10, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 611 n.10.
24. Id. at 86, 744 P.2d at 1144, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 611 (emphasis in original).
25. 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968). The court summarized the
three-category test as follows:
(1) facts about a defendant's behavior before the killing that show prior plan-
ning of it; (2) facts about any prior relationship or conduct with the victim
from which the jury could infer a motive; and (3) facts about the manner of
the killing from which the jury could infer that the defendant intentionally
killed the victim according to a preconceived plan.
Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 86, 744 P.2d at 1144, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 611 (citing Anderson, 70
Cal. 2d at 26-27, 447 P.2d at 949, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 557). See generally 17 CAL. JUR. 3D,
pt.1, Criminal Law §§ 238-40 (rev. ed. 1984).
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behavior evidencing planning of the crime-the court found "pre-
meditation" from both the evidence that the defendant carried his
gun into the store and that he threatened to shoot the clerks. 26 As-
sessing the second category--conduct evidencing motive-the court
concluded that the defendant's angry manner when he was refused
the sale of beer evinced motive.27 Finally, as to the third category-
manner evidencing intent and premeditation-the court found that
the victims did not provoke the defendant, which tended to show that
the attack was conceived in advance rather than a "'rash explosion
of violence.' "28 Thus, under all three elements of the Anderson test,
the court found evidence of the defendant's premeditation and delib-
eration to be sufficient.
Relying on Carlos v. Superior Court,29 the defendant maintained
that the felony-murder special circumstances finding was in error be-
cause the trial court did not instruct the jury that intent to kill was a
prerequisite. On the basis of People v. Anderson,30 the court re-
sponded that such an instruction is unnecessary absent evidence from
which the jury might find the defendant to be an accomplice rather
than a principal.3 1 Because all the evidence directly indicated that
the defendant was the actual killer, the defendant did not deserve re-
lief under Anderson.3 2
B. The Penalty Phase
The defendant claimed that under Witherspoon v. Illinois,33 the
trial court erred in excluding two prospective jurors because of their
unwillingness to impose the death penalty. The court noted that the
United States Supreme Court broadened the Witherspoon standard
to allow exclusion for cause where "'the juror's views would "pre-
vent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror
26. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 87, 744 P.2d at 1144, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
27. Id. at 87, 744 P.2d at 1145, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
28. Id. (quoting People v. Lunafelix, 168 Cal. App. 3d 97, 102, 214 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36
(1985)).
29. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
30. 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
31. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 89, 744 P.2d at 1146, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 613 (citing Ander-
son, 43 Cal. 3d at 1138-39, 742 P.2d at 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 611). See generally CAL.
JUR. 3D, supra note 7, §§ 3341, 3343.
32. Id. at 89, 744 P.2d at 1146, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
33. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). See generally 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury §§ 240, 245, 271 (1969);
Colussi, The Unconstitutionality of Death Qualifying a Jury Prior to the Determina-
tion of Guilt: The Fair-Cross-Section Requirement in Capital Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 595 (1982).
in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' .... 34 After review-
ing the record, the court concluded that the trial court could reason-
ably have understood the jurors' responses to indicate an inability to
vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. 35 Thus, the
court found the exclusion of the potential jurors to be proper.
During the penalty trial, the prosecutor introduced testimony that
the defendant had committed another murder two weeks before the
murder of the store clerk. The defendant correctly contended that it
was error under People v. Robertson 36 for the court not to give an in-
struction that the jury could not consider the prior murder as evi-
dence unless the defendant's guilt was established beyond a
reasonable doubt. The court found this error to be harmless because
there was an abundance of uncontroverted evidence to establish, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the prior
murder.37
The defendant contended that the court failed to properly instruct
the jury on the use of mitigating and sympathy evidence in the pen-
alty phase as mandated by People v. Easley.38 In rejecting both of
these arguments, the court first noted that Easley dealt only with the
inappropriateness of anti-sympathy instructions. 39 As an instruction
was not given in the present case, the court found Easley to be inap-
plicable.40 On the issue of mitigating instructions, the court observed
that a trial court must instruct the jury that it may consider any as-
pect of the defendant's character as mitigating evidence.4 1 The court
added, however, that the determination of a proper instruction is
made on a case by case basis.42 Based on the lack of mitigating evi-
dence offered by the defense, the court found no error in the trial
court's failure to give the mitigation instruction,43
The defendant also claimed that several prosecutorial comments
made during summation resulted in prejudice. Because defense
counsel failed to object in a timely manner, the court held that the
34. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 94, 744 P.2d at 1149, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 616-17 (citing
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (other citation omitted by court)). See gen-
erally B. WITKIN, supra note 14, §§ 400A, 400B; Note, Jury Selection - Exclusion of
Potential Jurors in Capital Sentencing Cases No Longer Requires that Venue Members
Express Their Views About the Death Penalty With Unmistakable Clarity, 16 SETON
HALL 851 (1986).
35. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 95-96, 744 P.2d at 1150-51, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18. See
generally B. WITKIN, supra note 7, §§ 405-08.
36. 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982).
37. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 98, 744 P.2d at 1152, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
38. 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983).
39. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 102, 744 P.2d at 1115, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Easley, 34 Cal. 3d at 878 n.10, 671 P.2d at 826 n.10, 196 Cal. Rptr. at
322 n.10).
42. Id. at 102-03, 744 P.2d at 1155, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
43. Id. at 103, 744 P.2d at 1156, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
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defendant's right to object to resulting error was waived.44 Thus, the
defendant claimed incompetence of counsel. He contended that his
attorney should have objected to the prosecutor's use of facts alleg-
edly not in evidence. The court found each of the questioned state-
ments to be "based on reasonable inferences from the evidence
before the jury," and if the comments were improper, the court
"fail[ed] to see any possible prejudice arising from the ... brief re-
marks."45 The defendant argued additionally that the district attor-
ney improperly offered his personal. opinion to the jury when
predicting the possibility of future violence by the defendant. The
court rejected these contentions based upon the factual circum-
stances of the case.46
Finally, the court was faced with the contention that the prosecu-
tor improperly commented on the impact on the victim's family that
releasing the defendant would have. The court agreed with the de-
fendant that, pursuant to Booth v. Maryland,47 such comments were
improper.48 The court found this misconduct to be harmless on the
grounds that the remarks were, unlike those in Booth, obvious and
nonspecific.49
The defendant then contended that his motion for a new trial
should have been granted because during the course of the trial, one
juror had a number of conversations with the defendant's girlfriend
in an effort to get a date with her. The court noted that jury miscon-
duct raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.50 The court found
that sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court's conclusion
that the parties involved did not discuss the case.5 1
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, consolidated with his ap-
44. Id. at 108, 744 P.2d at 1159, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
45. Id. at 109-10, 744 P.2d at 1160, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 627. See generally CAL. JUR.
3D, supra note 37, § 328.
46. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 110-11, 744 P.2d at 1160-61, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 627-28. The
court held that the district attorney's comments were protected as it was not miscon-
duct "to 'merely postulate what the evidence would arguably prove.'" Id. at 110, 744
P.2d at 1160, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 627-28 (citing People v. Ryner, 164 Cal. App. 3d 1075,
1086, 211 Cal. Rptr. 140, 147 (1985)). The court found that the prosecutor's comments
did not misstate the evidence or deprive the defendant of a right to a fair trial. Id. at
111, 744 P.2d at 1161, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 628. See generally B. WITKIN, supra note 7,
§ 452.
47. 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987).
48. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 113, 744 P.2d at 1162, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
49. Id, at 113, 744 P.2d at 1162, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
50. Id. at 117, 744 P.2d at 1165, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 632 (citations omitted). See gener-
ally 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appeal and Error § 781 (1962).
51. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 117, 744 P.2d at 1165, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
peal, the defendant made three assignments of error. The court is-
sued an order to show cause for the contention that his counsel's
decision not to present any mitigating evidence at the penalty trial
deprived him of effective assistance of counsel.52 After observing
that the defendant had "the burden of showing that 'counsel failed to
act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys...
"53 and that absent this failure, it was probable that the jury would
have returned a more favorable verdict,54 the court considered the
relative merit of the party's declarations. 55
Citing People v. Durham56 and People v. Jackson,57 the court de-
clined to hold the defense counsel incompetent because the choice
not to present the mitigating evidence was the result of a reasonably
competent and informed tactical decision58 The court, analogizing
the present facts to those in Jackson, observed that the defense coun-
sel's attempt to invoke mercy rather than rebut the prosecution's evi-
dence was reasonable.59 As such, the defendant's petition for writ of
habeas corpus was denied without an evidentiary hearing.6 0
IV. JUSTICE BROUSSARD'S CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Broussard concurred in the court's affirmation of the guilty
verdict and the special circumstances finding. The dissenting portion
condemned the denial of the writ of habeas corpus.6 1 Justice Brous-
sard argued that although a competent tactical choice will negate an
ineffective assistance claim, the tactical choice must be based upon
52. The other assignments of error involved his counsel's failure to develop a di-
minished capacity defense and the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied in
Los Angeles. Id. at 118, 744 P.2d at 1166, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 633. These claims were dis-
missed for failure to establish a prima facie case. Id. at 119 n.37, 744 P.2d at 1166 n.37,
241 Cal. Rptr. at 633 n.37.
53. Id. at 119, 744 P.2d at 1166, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 633 (quoting People v. Pope, 23
Cal. 3d 412, 425, 590 P.2d 859, 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (1979)).
54. Id. (citing People v. Fosselman, 33 Cal. 3d 572, 584, 649 P.2d 1144, 1151, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 855, 862 (1983)).
55. The declarations showed that the defendant had been abusing drugs and alco-
hol from an early age and that his delinquent activity resulted from his difficulty in
accepting success. The Attorney General presented declarations showing that as a
matter of trial strategy, presenting this mitigating evidence would have harmed the de-
fendant's chances more than it would have helped.
56. 70 Cal. 3d 171, 449 P.2d 198, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1969) (failing to present mitigat-
ing evidence not resulting in ineffective assistance of counsel).
57. 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1035 (1981) (informed choice of tactics not allowing ineffective assistance of counsel
claim).
58. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 121, 744 P.2d at 1167, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
59. Id. at 121, 744 P.2d at 1167-68, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
60. Id. at 123, 744 P.2d at 1169, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 636. See generally 22 CAL. JUR. 3D,
pt. 2 Criminal Law § 3857 (rev. ed. 1985).
61. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 124, 744 P.2d at 1169-70, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 637 (Brous-
sard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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adequate investigation.6 2 Examining the record, Justice Broussard
failed to find evidence of such an investigation. Accordingly, he
would have required an evidentiary hearing to resolve the remaining
factual questions.6 3
V. CONCLUSION
People v. Miranda adds little of a substantive nature to the law in
California. The decision is significant only in that it re-establishes
the hard-line approach to death penalty issues which was demanded
by California voters as a consequence of the Bird court's leniency.
Justice Broussard's dissent fails to recognize the gravity of the of-
fense committed and would create yet another loophole, in addition
to the plethora offered by the defendant, through which a convicted
killer might escape capital punishment. Although offered the oppor-
tunity, the majority did not recognize any such opening, choosing in-
stead to affirm both the trial court's finding of guilt and its
imposition of the death penalty.
STEVEN L. MILLER
V. INSURANCE LAW
The Legislature intended sections 1032 and 1256 of the
California Unemployment Insurance Code to be read
together; therefore, "spouse" includes an "imminent
spouse" under both sections: Altaville Drug Store, Inc. v.
Employment Development Department.
In Altaville Drug Store, Inc. v. Employment Development Depart-
ment, 44 Cal. 3d 231, 746 P.2d 871, 242 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1988), the issue
before the California Supreme Court was whether section 1032 of the
California Unemployment Insurance Code was intended by the Leg-
islature to act in accord with section 1256, and thereby apply the "im-
minent spouse" extension of the latter section to the former. In
reversing the court of appeal, the court held that because sections
1032 and 1256 are in pari materia, ambiguity exists as to the meaning
of "spouse" in section 1032 when compared to section 1256. In at-
tempting to effectuate the purpose of the law by ascertaining the in-
tent of the Legislature, the court looked to Select Base Materials v.
62. Id at 125, 744 P.2d at 170, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
63. Id at 127, 744 P.2d at 1172, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
Board of Equality, 51 Cal. 2d 640, 335 P.2d 672 (1959). The court
found that the Legislature intended to apply the "imminent spouse"
expansion to section 1032. Consequently, the case was remanded to
the trial court with instructions to grant Altaville Drug Store's (Al-
taville) petition for writ of mandate.
The controversy arose the day before the claimant's marriage when
she voluntarily resigned from employment with the respondent, Al-
taville, in order to move to a distant location to be with her new hus-
band. Under section 1256, an employee is entitled to unemployment
benefits where she has left her most recent work for good cause.
Section 1256 deems an individual to have left employment with good
cause if it is for the purpose of accompanying a spouse "to a place
from which it is impractical to commute." CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE
§ 1256 (West 1986). In an uncodified provision, section 1256 benefits
were extended to an employee "whose marriage is imminent." 1982
Cal. Stat. ch. 1073, 3873-74. See also MacGregor v. Unemployment In-
surance Appeals Board, 37 Cal. 3d 205, 689 P.2d 453, 207 Cal. Rptr.
823 (1984). Finding that the claimant left for good cause, the peti-
tioner, Employment Development Department (EDD), granted the
benefits and, over the respondent's objection, charged Altaville's re-
serve account rather than the pooled benefit fund, thereby increasing
the employer's rate of contribution to that fund.
Section 1032 dictates the circumstances under which benefits
awarded to a claimant are charged to the pooled fund. The court re-
jected EDD's contention that these circumstances did not exist be-
cause the claimant was not technically accompanying a "spouse"
pursuant to section 1032. The court recognized that the use of
"spouse" in section 1032 is unambiguous on its face when the statute
is read alone. However, when section 1032 is read together with the
extended definition in section 1256, ambiguity is created.
The court next moved to the determination of whether the "immi-
nent spouse" extension was intended to apply to section 1032. Turn-
ing to the 1979 Committee Report on this statute, ASSEM. COMM. ON
FINANCE, INSURANCE AND COMMERCE, REG. SESS., ANALYSIS OF As-
SEM. BILL No. 134 (1979-80 Reg. Sess.) (as amended May 12, 1979), the
court found that section 1032 was intended to be a corollary of section
1256 and was passed to remedy the inequitable circumstances facing
an employer whose employee resigned for the purpose of following a
spouse. See generally 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes § 161 (1980); 73 AM.
JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 147-79 (1974). Arguing that it is inequitable to
charge an employer's reserve account where the employee resigns to
join an "imminent spouse," the court held that the objectives of sec-
tion 1032 were advanced by assigning the word "spouse" an
equivalent meaning in both sections. Section 1032 now requires that
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employment benefits be charged to the pooled fund when an em-
ployee leaves work to accompany either a spouse or an imminent
spouse. See generally 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare
§§ 220, 226, 291 (1977).
In reaching its conclusion that both section 1032 and section 1256
were intended to apply to situations involving an "imminent spouse,"
the court failed to consider the limits of judicial power. As evidenced
by the court's discussion of the committee report, the legislature seri-
ously considered the appropriate language for section 1032. Yet, after
this consideration, the term "spouse" was left unchanged. By ex-
panding the statute and ignoring the plain language therein, the
court has superimposed its views on unemployment insurance on
those of the legislature. The court acted as a law maker rather than
law interpreter. This type of deviation from the traditional role of
the judiciary is both precedentially dangerous and a serious infringe-
ment on the separation of powers doctrine. As noted by Justice Ea-
gleson in his dissent, "[t]he majority's opinion is a well-meaning
effort to resolve what the majority deems to be a statutory inconsis-
tency. I am not persuaded there is one, but, if there is, the Legisla-
ture should resolve it." Altaville, 44 Cal. 3d at 241, 746 P.2d at 876,
242 Cal. Rptr. at 738 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
STEVEN L. MILLER
VI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Pursuant to section 5205 of the Business and Professions
Code, a county's designation of a parcel of land as a
"Desert Special Services Center," even if in conjunction
with a "Desert Living" designation and the appropriate
site approval, is insufficient to create an area zoned
primarily for commercial use, and as such, advertising
billboards sought to be placed adjacent to a highway, may
not be erected: United Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc. v.
Business, Transportation and Housing Agency.
In United Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc. v. Business, Transporta-
tion and Housing Agency, 44 Cal. 3d 242, 746 P.2d 877, 242 Cal. Rptr.
738 (1988), the issue before the California Supreme Court was
whether the proposed site for the plaintiff's billboard advertisements
was zoned "primarily" to allow "commercial and industrial activities"
pursuant to section 5205 of the California Business & Professions
Code. In reversing the court of appeal, the court unanimously held
that the Legislature did not intend to allow a county's designation of
an area as a "Desert Special Service Center" (DSSC) to constitute
zoning for commercial purposes, even if such a designation applied to
a "Desert Living" zone and was accompanied by the requisite site ap-
proval for commercial use. United Outdoor Advertising, 44 Cal. 3d at
251, 746 P.2d at 883-84, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
The conflict arose when the plaintiff, United Outdoor Advertising
Co. (Outdoor), proposed the erection of five illuminated billboards
along Interstate 15 in the desert town of Baker in San Bernardino
County. Prior to this action, the county had zoned the proposed sites
"Desert Living" (DL) a residential and agricultural designation per-
mitting commercial or industrial use only with the appropriate site
approval from the county. See generally 101a C.J.S. Zoning and
Planning § 57 (1978). In conjunction with its zoning plan, Baker was
also considered a "Desert Special Service Center," thereby allowing
the town to provide certain services for travelers and residents. In an
effort to comply with the county rules governing a DL zoning
designation, the plaintiff applied to the county for, and received, the
requisite site approval. When Outdoor applied to the Business,
Transportation and Housing Agency (the Agency) for billboard per-
mits, however, the permits were denied under the belief that the pro-
posed sites were not zoned "primarily" for commercial use. See
generally § 130. The plaintiff then asked the superior court for a writ
of mandate requiring the issuance of the permits. The superior court
granted the writ, the court of appeal affirmed, and the Agency ap-
pealed to the supreme court.
In affirming the Agency's contention that the proposed advertising
site was not an area "primarily" zoned for commercial use under sec-
tion 5202 of the Business and Professions Code, the court examined
the legislative history of the statute. The court first noted that the
California Outdoor Advertising Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 5200-31 (West 1974 & Supp. 1988) (the Act), was passed in an ef-
fort to conform with the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23
U.S.C. § 131 (1982), which established the national standard for ad-
vertising along interstate highways. United Outdoor Advertising, 44
Cal. 3d at 245, 746 P.2d at 880, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 741. The court next
commented that under the Act, billboards and other advertising dis-
plays along the highway were allowed only in "business areas." Id.
(quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5408 (West Supp. 1988)). Finally,
the court found a "business area" to be any area which is "within
1,000 feet of the nearest edge of a commercial or industrial activity
... [and also] 'zoned under authority of state law primarily to permit
industrial or commercial activities.'" United Outdoor Advertising, 44
Cal. 3d at 246, 746 P.2d at 880, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 741 (quoting CAL.
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Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5205). See generally B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 471 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp.
1984).
As the court found the first component of the "business area" test
to exist, the analysis centered on the "primarily zoned for commer-
cial activity" requirement. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the
site approval and DSSC designation created a primarily commercial
zoning category, the court scrutinized the relationship between the
legislative intent of the Act and the special zoning designations under
the county's general plan. See generally B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 466 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp.
1984). After determining that the Legislature intended the word
"primary" to delineate the "main use" of the land in question, the
court moved to an examination of San Bernardino's DL zone. In
holding that the DL designation did not constitute a zone primarily
for commercial use, the court reasoned that if such a zone was in-
tended to be primarily for commercial use, a site approval for such
use would not be required. Believing the site approval to be "an ex-
ception to a general zoning category," United Outdoor Advertising,
44 Cal. 3d at 248, 746 P.2d at 881, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 742 (citations omit-
ted), the court found that the DL zone did not establish a commercial
zone as it fell outside the Legislature's intended requirement of an
"actual" commercial use designation. Id. (citing Gaylord, Zoning:
Variances, Exceptions, and Conditional Use Permits in California, 5
UCLA L. REV. 179, 193 (1958)). See generally B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 484 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp.
1984).
Finally, the court examined the implications of the DSSC designa-
tion. In rejecting the plaintiff's contention that such a designation
was the equivalent of a commercial zone, the court noted that the
DSSC was not a permissible land use designation, but rather a "state-
ment of development policies" created to cultivate future develop-
ment. United Outdoor Advertising, 44 Cal. 3d at 249, 746 P.2d at 882,
242 Cal. Rptr. at 743 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West Supp.
1988)). Reasoning that the DSSC was only a temporary classification
that would later be replaced by a traditional permissible land use
designation, the court found that such a classification was not devel-
oped "primarily" to provide for commercial use and that, as such, the
DSSC zone was not within the intended scope of the Act. As neither
of the special zoning classifications instituted by San Bernardino
County was sufficient to create a commercial zone, the court denied
the plaintiff's request for a writ of mandate requiring that the
Agency issue the permits allowing the erection of the advertising bill-
boards. See generally B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Constitutional Law § 465 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984); 82 AM. JUR. 2D
Zoning and Planning §§ 281-87 (1976); 66 CAL. JUR. 3D Zoning and
Other Land Controls §§ 122-30 (1981); 101a C.J.S. Zoning and Plan-
ning § 12 (1978).
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